Resolving Arctic Sovereignty from a Scandinavian Perspective by Traner, Helena
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 44 | Issue 1
2011
Resolving Arctic Sovereignty from a Scandinavian
Perspective
Helena Traner
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Helena Traner, Resolving Arctic Sovereignty from a Scandinavian Perspective, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 497 (2011)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/23







RESOLVING ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY FROM A SCANDINAVIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Helena Traner 
Smaller Scandinavian states are at a distinct disadvantage as a re-
sult of the current framework governing the Arctic. In order to better pre-
serve their interests in the environment, the rights of their indigenous 
groups, and their security interests, these states should lead the push to 
develop a working group within the Arctic Council with a view toward the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The effort to secure sovereignty over continental shelves in the Arc-
tic has at once been described as a “land grab,1 a “gold rush,”2 and, “a race 
to claim Arctic resources.”3 Russia sparked this frenzy when it planted a 
flag at the bottom of the Arctic seafloor in 2007, claiming a vast section of 
the Arctic continental shelf as Russian territory.4 The event brought interna-
tional attention to its prior 2001 claim to sovereignty over a large region of 
the Arctic as part of a natural extension of Russian territory.5 Russia ad-
vanced this claim under the auspices of Article 76 of the United Nations 
Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for review by the Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).6 In 2002, the CLCS 
recommended Russia resubmit the claim with more supportive scientific 
evidence.7  
Such headlines paint the Arctic Circle as a lawless “wild west” in 
which the “Arctic Five” (Russia, Canada, United States, Denmark, and 
Norway) jockey for control over what is perhaps the world’s last remaining 
unexplored and undeveloped frontier. The Arctic Five reject this notion, 
insisting instead upon the need to arrive at, “[an] orderly settlement of any 
possible overlapping claims” by adhering to international law, the existing 
law of the sea framework, and remaining committed to working together 
within international fora such as the Arctic Council.8    
  
 1 Jessa Gamble, Polar Meltdown Triggers International Arctic Landgrab, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN, Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=po 
lar-meltdown-triggers-landgrab. 
 2 Paul Reynolds, The Arctic’s New Gold Rush, BBC (Oct. 25, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.u 
k/2/hi/business/4354036.stm. 
 3 Doug Mellgren, Technology, Climate Change Spark Race to Claim Arctic Resources, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2007-03-24-arcticbon 
anza_N.htm.  
 4 Russia Plants Flag Under N Pole, BBC (Aug. 2, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/euro 
pe/6927395.stm (noting Russia’s flag plant in 2007 and suggesting the stunt was intended to 
bring attention to its 2001 claim). 
 5 Id.  
 6 See Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, COMM’N ON THE LIMITS OF 
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission 
_submissions.htm (stating Russia’s submission date in December of 2001).  
 7 See U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 38–41, U.N. Doc. 
A/57/57/Add. 1 (October 8, 2002) (summarizing the findings of the CLCS, and recommend-
ing that Russia revise and resubmit its claim regarding the Central Arctic Ocean).  
 8 Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 362. At this meeting, hosted by Den-
mark, several relevant actors represented within the Arctic Council were notably not invited 
to participate, including Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and all of the indigenous constituencies 
which enjoy “permanent participant” status on the Council. Id. 
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The current international legal framework is ill-equipped to settle 
conflicting continental shelf claims and ensure that each state’s interests, 
particularly those of smaller Scandinavian states, are fully respected.9 The 
present Note therefore examines this legal framework governing the Arctic 
from a Scandinavian perspective. To that end, the Note will first provide 
background on various motivations and interests at stake for establishing 
sovereignty over an extended continental shelf in light of environmental 
concerns, explore the existing mechanism for resolving overlapping conti-
nental shelf disputes under UNCLOS, and identify some of the particular 
disputes in which the interests of Scandinavian states may be at risk. Next, 
the Note further examines some of the key national interests of Scandinavi-
an states, and suggests that the mechanism for resolving claims to an ex-
tended continental shelf in the Arctic is insufficient, on its own, to protect 
these interests. Finally, the Note argues that Scandinavian states should lead 
the effort to strengthen the Arctic Council and recommends modifications 
by which to accomplish this objective.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  Motivations for Staking a Claim vs. Environmental Risks 
The Arctic Five seek to establish sovereignty over and extend their 
continental shelves despite environmental risk. A primary motivation for the 
Arctic Five to do so is the perceived economic development prospects of oil 
and natural gas resources; for as much as, “90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids 
may remain to be found in the Arctic.”10 Advancements in offshore oil and 
gas extraction technologies render these opportunities possible.11 Neverthe-
less, harsh Arctic conditions pose significant obstacles to the extraction of 
these resources and increase the risk of disastrous oil spills.12 Icy conditions 
  
 9 Throughout this note “Scandinavian states” will be used to refer to the group of states 
that collectively represent themselves as such, including Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 
However, emphasis will be placed on the states of Denmark and Norway as these states have 
tangible claims to the continental shelf. “Nordic states” will be used to refer collectively to 
the states of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland.  
 10 KENNETH BIRD ET. AL, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RES. APPRAISAL ASSESSMENT TEAM, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED 
OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 1 (2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/20 
08/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. 
 11 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, TECHNOLOGY IN THE ARCTIC 2 (2010), available at http://www-
static.shell.com/static/innovation/downloads/arctic/technology_in_the_arctic.pdf (comment-
ing on advances in oil and gas exploration and production technologies). 
 12 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, OIL SPILL RESPONSE CHALLENGES IN ARCTIC WATERS 3 (2007); 
see also Kristin Noelle Casper, Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic: Softening of Ice 
Demands Hardening of International Law, 49 NAT. RES. J. 825, 832–34 (2009) (summariz-
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inhibit the ability to clean up and effectively respond to such a spill.13 For 
example, oil trapped beneath ice takes much longer to naturally biodegrade 
and mitigation strategies such the use of dispersants and in-situ burning are 
ineffective under such conditions.14 
Environmental degradation of the ozone layer via global climate 
change is also influencing the motivation to establish sovereignty and com-
plicating the balance between environment and industry. Scientists predict 
ice free summers in the Arctic by the year 2030.15 Freeing up shipping lanes 
in the Arctic year-round would still be impossible due to the unsuitable win-
ter conditions.16 However, establishing sovereignty over an extended conti-
nental shelf is now a forward looking approach for Arctic states. This is 
especially true given that expanded shipping lanes such as the Northern Sea 
Route and Northwest Passage reduce the time and cost necessary to deliver 
oil, gas, and other resources, and can provide substantial benefits to the state 
that controls regulation of its use.17 Moreover, technological improvements 
in the ability of icebreakers to handle this terrain suggest that this possibility 
could eventually become viable for the long term.18 This increase in ship-
ping traffic will include large icebreaking vessels which destroy and break 
apart the ice and further influence climate change by releasing carbon emis-
  
ing the detrimental impacts of oil and gas exploration and exploitation at each stage of the 
process). 
 13 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 12, at 7–9, 27 (WWF advises against any further oil 
and gas exploration in the Arctic until this “response gap” can be closed). In addition to the 
problems presented by the “response gap,” stopping a leak at an extraction site, as attempted 
in the recent British Petroleum crisis in the Gulf of Mexico, is exponentially more difficult to 
do in a frigid Arctic environment. Challenges unique to oil spill response in the Arctic in-
clude sea ice, wind, temperature, limited visibility, and sea state. Id. at 15–19; see also Eliza-
beth Weise & Doyle Rice, How Bad Could BP Oil Spill Get for the Gulf and the Nation? 
USA TODAY, June 9, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/2010-06-09-
1Aoilhowbad09_CV_N.htm (describing the difficulties associated with oil spill response in 
the Gulf of Mexico). 
 14 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 12, at 7, 16. 
 15 Arctic Ice Could be Gone by 2030, THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.telegra 
ph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/8005620/Arctic-ice-could-be-gone-by-2030.html.  
 16 The Arctic Council maintains that shipping in the region will continue to remain sea-
sonal. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 86 (2009).  
 17 See Id. at 115–17 (discussing fees charged by Russia with respect to passage through 
the Northern Sea Route). The Arctic Council does not predict the Northwest Passage to be-
come a viable shipping route until after 2020, but does note that destinational shipping along 
this route is expected to increase. Id. at 5. The transport of oil and gas via the Northern Sea 
Route is predicted to reach as high as 40 million tons a year by 2020. Id.   
 18 See Norway: Double-acting Ships Make Arctic Oil Export Routes Competitive, WORLD 
OIL, Apr. 1, 2001 (describing advances in icebreaker technology, particularly “oblique ice-
breakers” which have been developed to break through heavy ice ridging during the winter in 
the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland).  
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sions and other contaminants into the Arctic marine environment.19 The 
Arctic cruise tourism industry represents another economic motivator for 
the Arctic Five, while at the same time contributing to an increase in ship 
traffic and presenting additional environmental risks to Arctic marine life.20   
Climate change also impacts the Arctic fishing industry. Fish stocks 
in Arctic waters respond by altering their migratory routes.21 As fishing 
seasons grow longer due to summer Arctic ice melt and fish head farther 
north to international waters, this natural resource will become increasingly 
vulnerable to over-exploitation.22 Though the extension of a state’s conti-
nental shelf under UNCLOS would not award any additional rights to the 
exploitation of fish present in such waters, economic and environmental 
considerations are still of concern to Arctic states. Conflicting resource 
management strategies are at the center of the struggle to maintain a balance 
between preservation of the marine environment and sustaining local econ-
omies and domestic industries.23   
B.  UNCLOS and Sovereignty 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
governs the relationships between states seeking to “stake a claim” to the 
Arctic continental shelf. UNCLOS governs both the procedural mechanisms 
  
 19 The Arctic Council has acknowledged these environmental impacts as having potential-
ly detrimental consequences, as the destruction of the ice impacts Arctic residents dependent 
on over-ice travel, and an increase in the release of pollutants may require new IMO regula-
tions. ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 5.  
 20 See, e.g., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, CRUISE TOURISM ON SVALBARD: A RISKY BUSINESS? 
3–4 (2004) (noting that this industry has grown steadily in popularity among tourists, while 
increasing the chances for an oil spill, contributing to Arctic pollution, and potentially expos-
ing otherwise pristine Arctic environments to such contaminants and risks).  
 21 Recognizing that climate change may impact the migration routes of fish stocks, the 
Arctic Council claims these stocks have always been affected by fluctuation in climate and 
circumstances. However, the Arctic Council acknowledges that this does not mitigate the fact 
that changes in the migratory patterns of fish stocks lead to conflicts between states over how 
this resource should be managed. The Arctic Council recommends a precautionary approach 
to such management. See Hjalmar Vilhjalmsson & Alf Hakon Hoel, et.al, Fisheries and 
Aquaculture, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 706–07 (2005). 
 22 See E. CARINA H. KESKITALO, CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION IN THE ARCTIC: 
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 174 (2008) (discussing impact 
of climate change on salmon); see also Climate Change Extends Arctic Fishing, CBC NEWS 
(Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2010/10/25/arctic-climate-change-baff 
in-fisheries.html (noting impact of climate change on fishing industry off the northern coast 
of Baffin Island). 
 23 For example, Norway and Russia have conflicted over this issue, and even when these 
two states were able to reach an agreement, other states can intervene and weaken such bilat-
eral arrangements when fish move to international waters. Vilhjalmmson et al., supra note 
21, at 707.  
File: Traner 2 Created on: 1/21/2012 6:47:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:41:00 PM 
2011] RESOLVING ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY 503 
for the assertion of such claims and the substantive determinations of exist-
ing maritime boundary lines.24 With regard to the latter, maritime bounda-
ries consist of four zones: a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf.25 
Beyond the 200 nautical mile mark of the EEZ, a state must submit 
formal claims founded upon scientific evidence to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in order to demonstrate that its con-
tinental shelf is a natural extension of its territory.26 States must submit such 
a claim within 10 years of the entry into force of UNCLOS for that State.27 
These claims may extend from the same baseline used to measure the terri-
torial sea up to a maximum of 350 nautical miles.28  
Where a state successfully establishes a claim over its continental 
shelf, Article 77 of UNCLOS provides: “The coastal State exercises over 
the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and 
exploiting its natural resources.”29 In contrast to a state’s territorial sea, con-
tiguous zone, and EEZ, a state’s sovereign rights over its continental shelf 
are limited to only the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 
Unlike Article 56 (describing a state’s sovereign rights on the EEZ), Article 
77 does not address the exclusive right to the protection and preservation of 
  
 24 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. Despite the media portrayal of the Arctic as a lawless wild west, 
there is a legal mechanism for establishing a claim under UNCLOS. Articles 2, 3, and 33 of 
UNCLOS pertain to the setting of maritime boundaries, whereas Article 76 pertains to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf. Id. While the United States has not yet ratified 
UNCLOS, it observes the demarcation of zones promulgated by UNCLOS as part of interna-
tional customary law. Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark have all signed and ratified 
UNCLOS. Id. The issue of whether or not the United States may participate in submitting a 
claim is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 25 A state’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles measured from its baseline, and states 
may exercise complete sovereignty in this zone. Id. art. 2–3. The only limitation upon a 
state’s sovereignty in this zone is that it must afford other states the right to innocent passage. 
Between 12 and 24 nautical miles is the contiguous zone, in which states may prevent in-
fringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations, as well as pur-
sue any violations of these laws committed within the territorial sea. Id. art. 33. In the exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ), which extends to 200 nautical miles, states maintain the sover-
eign right to exploration and exploitation, conservation, and management of natural re-
sources and jurisdiction over the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Id. 
art. 56–57. 
 26 Id. art. 76. 
 27 Id. annex II, art. 4. Respectively, Denmark therefore has until 2014 to submit its claim 
and Canada until 2013. Russia plans to resubmit its claim in 2014. Russia Uses New Re-
search Data to Enhance Arctic Territorial Claim, RIA NOVOSTI (Nov. 13, 2010), http://en.ria 
n.ru/russia/20101113/161323182.html.  
 28 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76.  
 29 Id. art. 77. 
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the marine environment on the continental shelf.30 The omission of this lan-
guage from Article 77 therefore leaves uncertainty as to what series of in-
ternational environmental legal frameworks will apply to newly extended 
continental shelves in terms of conservation and protection of the marine 
environment.31 This uncertainty increases as a result of the conflicting de-
velopment and resource management approaches taken by the various 
members of the Arctic Five (a subject of further examination in Section III 
of this Note).     
C.  Deficiencies in CLCS Procedure  
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is a 
scientific commission comprised of 21 members selected on the basis of 
equitable geographical representation. The CLCS advances recommenda-
tions as to where states should draw their boundary lines based upon a sci-
entific analysis of a state’s claim, with reference to their expertise in geolo-
gy, geophysics, and hydrography.32 As a scientific body, the CLCS does not 
have the authority to rule on a state’s legal interpretation of UNCLOS, how-
ever, there are multiple permissible methods under Article 76 for calculating 
and measuring the outer limits of the continental shelf.33 A submitting state 
can choose whichever method is most advantageous to its interests, and can 
even alternate between methods in one submission to make the most of a 
claim.34   
  
 30 Compare UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 56 (“In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal 
State has…(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with 
regard to…(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment”), with UNCLOS, 
supra note 24, art. 77 (“The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.”). 
 31 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 77. The right of a state to exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources on its continental shelf is exclusive in the sense that no one may develop 
such resources without consent of the sovereign state. However, mention of the responsibility 
for natural resource management is notably absent from this article. Id. 
 32 Id. art. 76, para. 8 and annex II; Members of the Commission, CLCS (Apr. 8, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_members.htm#Members. Norway and 
Russia are the only states with claims to the Arctic continental shelf currently represented on 
the CLCS. Id. 
 33 These two methods include the Irish, or Gardiner formula, and the Hedberg formula. 
Both methods involve a reference point, known as the “foot of the slope,” the point at which 
the continental shelf drops off and the deep ocean floor begins. The Gardiner formula uses 
geological analysis of the foot of the slope to establish the outermost fixed points at which 
the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least one percent of the shortest distance to the foot 
of the slope. In contrast, the Hedberg formula uses hydrographical or geomorphological 
criteria to establish the outermost fixed points. Kristin Bartenstein, Flag-Planting, 65 INT’L J. 
187, 194–95 (2009). 
 34 Id. at 196 (noting that these scientific methods can be alternated within the same sub-
mission as Norway did in 2006).  
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In addition to these problems, there are crucial ambiguities sur-
rounding the terms “submarine elevations” and “submarine ridges,” which 
states may exploit to claim sovereignty beyond the 350 nautical mile limit.35 
Furthermore, the CLCS’s proceedings lack transparency, such that states 
cannot rely on CLCS precedent when developing claims.36 States seeking to 
submit a claim must conduct expensive, time consuming research with very 
little guidance, only to run the risk of being required to resubmit the claim.37 
This process therefore provides very little incentive among states to cooper-
ate. States with the necessary financial means and expertise to conduct Arc-
tic continental shelf research derive no benefit from sharing or cooperating 
in gathering such information with other states.38 Finally, while UNCLOS 
stipulates that the CLCS recommendations are “final and binding,”39 it is 
ultimately for the submitting state to declare its own boundary line, to which 
it will be required to adhere.40 
D.  Resolving Simultaneous Conflicting Claims to the Continental Shelf  
The CLCS has no mechanism for resolving two simultaneously 
submitted scientifically accurate yet conflicting claims. States must there-
fore turn to the other provisions of UNCLOS for assistance when attempting 
to resolve continental shelf disputes. Article 279 of UNCLOS obligates 
states to resolve disputes in a peaceful manner.41 If states cannot agree, they 
may submit the dispute to either the International Tribunal for the Law of 





 35 Id. at 196–97 (Submarine ridges are subject to the 350 nautical mile limit. Submarine 
elevations that are “natural components of the continental margin” are not, and it is quite 
difficult to distinguish between the two, both physically and according to the language of 
UNCLOS.); see also UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76.   
 36 Tavis Potts & Clive Schofield, Current Legal Developments in the Arctic, 23 INT’L J. 
MARINE AND COASTAL L. 151, 165–67 (2008) (CLCS proceedings are conducted in secret to 
protect the confidentiality of the submitting state’s methods). 
 37 Id. at 166. For example, Russia was asked by the CLCS to resubmit its claim with more 
scientific evidence in 2002. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 38 Potts & Schofield, supra note 36, at 167. While Potts and Schofield suggest cooperation 
may be beneficial for states, it has not politically materialized. See infra note 52 and accom-
panying text.  
 39 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76, para. 8.  
 40 Bartenstein, supra note 33, at 193 (stating that the state will be bound by its own pro-
nouncement of the extent of its boundary). 
 41 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 279. 
 42 Id. art. 287, para. 1 (explaining that states may choose any of these forums upon sign-
ing, ratifying or acceding to UNLCOS, or anytime thereafter by specifying in a written decla-
ration). 
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When states involved in a dispute have elected different forums, 
UNCLOS generally requires the use of arbitration, unless the parties other-
wise reach an agreement.43 The Arctic Five have all selected different fo-
rums by written declaration.44 However, Arctic continental shelf disputes 
may be advanced pursuant to Article 298 of UNCLOS, which provides that 
states may reject all dispute resolution mechanisms as to boundary delimita-
tion.45 This exception will provide the opportunity for Arctic states to deny 
to be bound by any tribunal if the dispute involves the delimitation of the 
continental shelf.46 Therefore, the only recourse the Arctic states will be left 
with to resolve conflicting continental shelf disputes is international diplo-
macy and negotiation.47     
E.  Challenges to Resolution by Diplomacy 
The CLCS process affords the Arctic members of UNCLOS the ul-
timate respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity by allowing them 
  
 43 Id. art 287, para. 5. States party to UNCLOS that have selected different forums may 
submit to arbitration unless they otherwise agree, but are not required to do so. However, 
Article 288 states that one of these forums must have jurisdiction over disputes arising under 
UNCLOS. Thus when reading Articles 287 and 288 in conjunction, arbitration is the fallback 
forum. See id. art. 288.  
 44 Stephanie Holmes, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty, 9 
CHI. J. INT’L. L. 323, 336 n.102 (2008) (citing U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE LAW OF 
THE SEA, OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS 
WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND TO THE 
AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, at 98–101, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.3 (1996)). 
Canada elected to resolve disputes in the International Court of Justice or by spe-
cial arbitration under Annex VII. Denmark and Norway elected the International 
Court of Justice. Russia elected arbitration under Annex VII, except for disputes 
related to fisheries, the environment, scientific research, and navigation, for which 
it elected arbitration under Annex VII; and disputes related to detained vessels and 
crews, for which it elected the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.  
Id. Again, the subject of whether or not the United States may submit a claim at all under 
UNCLOS is outside the scope of this Note. However, States that accept provisions of 
UNCLOS as customary international law—as the U.S. has—may be subject to ICJ jurisdic-
tion. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Environment and Trade: Competing Paradigms in Interna-
tional Law, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE 
CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 543, 549 (Antony Anghie & Garry Sturgess, eds., 1998) but 
see infra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that lack of standing may be a challenge 
necessary to overcome even for states party to UNCLOS).  
 45 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 298 (permitting states to opt out of any of the suggested 
forums when a dispute relates to boundary delimitation.) 
 46 Holmes, supra note 44, at 336–37 (Canada, Denmark, and Russia all opted not to be 
bound by any tribunal for disputes involving boundary delimitation via Article 298 of 
UNCLOS). 
 47 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 279 (Obliging states to resolve their disputes peacefully). 
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to resolve disputes regarding the extension of continental shelves via inter-
national diplomacy. Yet with respect to the Arctic, this serves as a signifi-
cant advantage for geopolitically well-positioned states, such as Canada and 
Russia, to the disadvantage of smaller Scandinavian states, such as Den-
mark and Norway.48 Moreover, bargaining away the Arctic in this manner 
leaves uncertainty as to how and which international environmental regula-
tions will apply to the newly expanded boundary lines.49 Some of the Scan-
dinavian states’ interests, such as environmental policies, the rights of their 
respective indigenous peoples, and security concerns will not be secured as 
a result of this process.  
  
  
 48 See Nikolaj Petersen, The Arctic as a New Arena for Danish Foreign Policy: The Ilulis-
sat Initiative and its Implications, DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 35, 44–48 (2009) 
(noting that Russia stands the most to gain in seeking to re-establish its former superpower 
status and is increasing its Arctic military capacities; Canada has also increased such military 
capabilities). 
 49 See Casper, supra note 12, at 865–66 (“There is no consensus in the legal/academic 
community as to what the existing arrangements are and if they can provide sufficient protec-
tion for the Arctic.”). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND PROTECTION OF SCANDINAVIAN 
INTERESTS 
A.  Disputes in Which the Interests of Scandinavian States May Be at 
Risk 
1.  Lomonosov Ridge dispute 
50
 
Denmark, Canada, and Russia will soon be faced with the problem 
of resolving a dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge because the CLCS pro-
cess provides no mechanism for resolving simultaneously submitted con-
flicting claims.51 Though Canada and Denmark have been cooperating in 
the data collection process, these states still send their own national scien-
tists and maintain their own national programs.52 Russia is not a part of this 
  
 50 Richard Galpin, The Struggle for Arctic Riches, BBC (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/world-11381773 (edited by author to improve clarity in reprint). 
 51 The choice of different dispute resolution forums and the rejection of any tribunal by 
Canada, Denmark, and Russia leave this dispute without a forum. See supra notes 44–46 and 
accompanying text.  
 52 See Danish-Canadian Bathymetric and Gravimetric Survey of the Arctic Ocean, 
CONTINENTAL SHELF PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2009), http://a76.dk/cgi-bin/nyheder-m-m.cgi?id=123 
7357596|cgifunction=form (describing these operations as “part of the Danish and Canadian 
national UNCLOS programmes” and stating, “the UNCLOS programme is in Denmark 
managed by the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), and in Canada by 
the Geological Survey of Canada (GCS) and the Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS)”). 
But see DANISH INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 53 (Nanna 
Hvidt & Hans Mouritzen, eds., 2009) (noting Danish-Canadian cooperation). 
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process, and has its own data collection team.53 Thus, even if Canada and 
Denmark submit a joint claim, it is still likely to directly conflict with Rus-
sia’s.  
In the event that Russia or Canada pronounce an aggressive claim 
or boundary line based upon their interpretation of the CLCS scientific rec-
ommendations, Denmark will seek to challenge such a claim before the 
ICJ.54 Denmark may be able to challenge a claim made by Canada since 
Canada and Denmark have elected the same forum, but Russia cannot be 
drawn in, nor can arbitration serve as a fallback mechanism.55 Notwith-
standing this problem, there is still a possibility that Denmark may lack 
standing to challenge both the boundary pronouncements of Russia and 
Canada based upon the CLCS’s recommendations.56 The only recourse 
Denmark could be left with is international diplomacy and negotiation, 
which, as the next scenario illustrates, still may not meet a small Scandina-
vian state’s needs and interests, and leaves open the potential for exploita-
tion.   
2.  Norway-Russia Treaty 
On September 15, 2010, Norway and Russia signed a treaty resolv-
ing their maritime boundary in the Barents Sea via international diploma-
cy.57  
  
 53 Russia claims it invested $50 million in researching its continental shelf claim in 2010. 
Russia, Canada Back Science to Resolve Dispute Over Arctic Claims (Update 1), RIA 
NOVOSTI, Sept. 16, 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20100916/160615112.html.  
 54 DECLARATIONS OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK TO UNCLOS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, Vol. III, pt. I, ch. XXI at 451, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (April 1, 2009) (noting Danish selection of the 
ICJ as its venue for UNCLOS-related dispute resolution). See supra notes 44–46 and accom-
panying text (showing that Denmark and Canada chose the ICJ and Russia chose arbitration, 
yet all three have rejected the arbitration procedures under Article 298 for boundary delimita-
tion disputes).  
 55 Denmark and Canada chose the ICJ, Russia chose arbitration, and all three rejected 
Article 298’s arbitration procedures for boundary delimitation disputes. Holmes, supra note 
44, at 336–37. 
 56 See H.E. Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum, President, Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Statement at the 73rd Biennial Conference of the International Law Association, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil: The Outer Continental Shelf: Some Considerations Concerning Applications 
and the Potential Role of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 12–15 (Aug. 21, 
2008), available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/statements_of_president/ 
wolfrum/ila_rio_210808_eng.pdf (describing several difficulties associated with maintaining 
standing in a continental shelf dispute).  
 57 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Mari-
time Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean art. 1, Nor.-
Russ., Sept. 15, 2010, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/ 
avtale_engelsk.pdf [hereinafter Nor.-Russ. Treaty].  
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58 
While the treaty between Russia and Norway tends to indicate a 
willingness to cooperate, Norway still faces some challenges and disad-
vantages as a result of this agreement that could prove detrimental to its 
national interests.59 For example, under Article 4 of the treaty, the parties 
have agreed to collaborate regarding fishing activities, applying a precau-
tionary approach to conservation, management, and exploitation of strad-
dling fish stocks.60 Yet the entire article regarding fisheries management is 
vague and does not stipulate what may happen if either party over-exploits 
migratory fish stocks or how such a dispute would be resolved in the event 
of third party exploitation.61 In addition, while Article 5 of the treaty ad-
dresses hydrocarbon exploitation and stipulates that any trans-boundary 
resources are to be developed jointly, it is silent as to how responsibility 
should be apportioned in the event of an oil spill or accident.62 Finally, the 
rights of indigenous peoples of both Russia and Norway to exploit these 
resources are not mentioned at all within this treaty.63  
  
 58 Russia and Norway Sign Maritime Border Agreement, BBC (Sept. 15, 2010), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11316430 (edited by author to improve clarity in reprint).  
 59 Nor.-Russ. Treaty, supra note 57, at pmbl. 
 60 Id art. 4. 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. art. 5. 
 63 The Sami people inhabit the northernmost regions of Russia, Sweden, Finland, and 
Norway. To supplement their traditional livelihood of reindeer herding, many work as full-
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B.  Scandinavian Interests  
The Scandinavian states maintain several key policy concerns in the 
Arctic which are of critical national importance and are at odds with those 
of other members of the Arctic Five. Specifically, the Scandinavian con-
cerns include: (1) an approach to resource and environmental management 
at odds with Russian development expectations, (2) an increased obligation 
to respect the rights of indigenous peoples, particularly the Greenland Inuit 
and the Sami, and, (3) a heightened security interest in ensuring denucleari-
zation of the Arctic. Under the current international legal framework gov-
erning the Arctic, these interests are insufficiently protected, particularly in 
light of the Lomonosov Ridge dispute and the area of the Barents Sea gov-
erned by the Norwegian-Russian treaty.  
1.  Conflicting approaches: Scandinavian environmental protection 
arrangements vs. Russian development expectations 
The Scandinavian states favor a sustainable and precautionary ap-
proach to any new oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation in the 
Arctic.64 At the international level, there is currently no regulatory instru-
ment governing offshore hydrocarbon activities in the Arctic,65 though all of 
the Arctic states party to UNCLOS must fulfill a general obligation regard-
ing protection and conservation of the Arctic marine environment.66 The 
Scandinavian states of Denmark and Norway have demonstrated an in-
  
time commercial fisherman in this region. DEBORAH B. ROBINSON, THE SAMI OF NORTHERN 
EUROPE 4, 25 (2002).  
 64 Denmark and Norway maintain a notably visible foreign policy presence in this regard. 
See, e.g., Per Stig Møller, Foreign Minister of Denmark, Speech at the Arctic Council in 
Tromsø (Apr. 29, 2009) (“We must safeguard continued sustainable development . . . .”); 
Arne Walther, Norwegian Ambassador to Japan, Presentation at the National Press Club of 
Japan: Norway in the Forefront for Sustainable Global Development (July 20, 2010) (“Our 
policy is to safeguard Norwegian economic, environmental and security policy interests by 
means of a coherent policy that integrates the three.”).  
 65 See TIMO KOIVUROVA & ERIK J. MOLENAAR, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF THE MARINE ARCTIC: I. OVERVIEW AND GAP ANALYSIS 
31–33 (2009) (noting that there are some limited regional and multilateral mechanisms for 
such regulation, including UNCLOS, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment in the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)). While these multilateral arrangements 
governing the regulation of hydrocarbon exploitation exist, not all states are parties to these 
agreements; the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, and Canada, Russia, and the United 
States are not parties to OSPAR. Id. 
 66 See Casper, supra note 12, at 845–47 (discussing the general framework for environ-
mental protection under UNCLOS). The extent of states’ obligation to cooperate under 
UNCLOS depends upon a determination of whether or not the Arctic Ocean can be consid-
ered an enclosed or semi-enclosed area and is beyond the discussion of this Note. Id.  
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creased interest in cooperative protection of the Arctic marine environment 
by voluntarily committing to treaties placing tighter regulations on pollution 
of Arctic waters by oil and gas exploration.67 For example, Denmark, Nor-
way, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden are all party to the Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) 
which requires these states to: 
Take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution and…take the 
necessary measures to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects 
of human activities so as to safeguard human health and to conserve eco-




OSPAR has both a full time Secretariat and the ability to impose 
recommendations and binding decisions.69 Moreover, the Scandinavian 
states party to this treaty are under obligations to apply the precautionary 
principle, the polluter pays principle, best available techniques, and best 
environmental practices, and utilize the latest developments in technology 
to minimize negative impacts on the environment.70 In addition, OSPAR 
requires these states to cooperate regarding trans-boundary pollution is-
sues,71 and provides for an arbitration mechanism for the settling of disputes 
arising under the convention.72  
  
 67 See Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlan-
tic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1072 [hereinafter OSPAR], available at http://www.ospar.org/ 
html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text_2007.pdf; Agreement be-
tween Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden Concerning Cooperation in 
Measures to Deal with Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful Substances, Mar. 29, 
2003, 2084 U.N.T.S. 324 [hereinafter 1993 Agreement]. 
 68 OSPAR, supra note 67, art. 2(1)(a).  
 69 Article 10 of OSPAR establishes a commission which monitors implementation of 
OSPAR and makes recommendations. Id. art 10. Article 13 mandates the commission’s 
ability to issue binding decisions, requiring at least a three-quarters majority vote. Id. art. 13. 
 70 Article 2(2)(a) of OSPAR defines the precautionary principle. Id. art. 2. This principle 
requires, “preventative measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for con-
cern that substances or energy introduced, directly, or indirectly, into the marine environment 
may bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, 
damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no 
conclusive evidence of a causal relationships between the inputs and effects.” Id. (emphasis 
added). Under article 2(2)(b), the polluter bears the costs of pollution prevention, control, 
and reduction measures. Id. Additionally, article 2(3) requires that when implementing 
OSPAR, parties consider using the best available techniques and environmental practices, as 
well as utilize the latest technological developments. Id.  
 71 Whenever pollution from one party is likely injure the interests of any other party, the 
injured party can request consultation in order to reach a cooperation agreement. Id. art. 21. 
 72 Issues may be submitted to arbitration by any requesting party. Id. art 32(1). The award 
of the arbitral tribunal is binding. Id. art. 32(10)(a). 
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The Scandinavian states have further agreed to cooperate among 
one another to protect the Arctic marine environment against pollution by 
oil or other harmful substances which present a grave and imminent danger 
to their material interests.73 The 1993 Agreement between Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (1993 Agreement), establishes a moni-
toring, investigatory, and reporting scheme that requires these states to noti-
fy one another of substantial pollution within their territorial seas, fishing 
grounds, EEZs, and continental shelves, and to provide mutual assistance to 
one another in the event of an emergency.74 These agreements between the 
Scandinavian and Nordic states indicate a preference for a cooperative and 
cautionary approach to new oil and gas development at odds with the devel-
opment expectations of other members of the Arctic Five. 
All members of the Arctic Five, including Russia, are party to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 73/78), but fundamental difficulties with its implementation 
may still place the Scandinavian states’ environmental interests in the Arctic 
at risk.75 For example, though a Scandinavian state may report violations of 
this treaty occurring outside its jurisdiction to the offending vessel’s flag 
state, flag states may refuse to take action against their own vessels.76 
MARPOL 73/78 applies to oil rigs as well as ships, but it does not protect 
Scandinavian states from pollution by oil and gas development occurring 
outside its jurisdiction.77 Such pollution may still affect the environmental 
interests of Scandinavian states as outputs by offshore oil rigs of oil, water, 
and gas can inject “chemical cocktails of active ingredients” into ocean 
streams.78 Moreover, national governments bear the burden of investigating 
and prosecuting violations of MARPOL 73/78, which may prove difficult 
for Scandinavian states considering complex requirements and limited re-
  
 73 1993 Agreement, supra note 67, art. 1. 
 74 Id. art. 2–8. 
 75 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78] (modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto 
(MARPOL 73/78) on Feb. 17, 1978, entered into force Oct. 2, 1983). 
 76 See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32450, CRUISE SHIP POLLUTION: 
BACKGROUND, LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND KEY ISSUES, 9 (2008) (noting that the Govern-
ment Accountability Office of the United States has documented a poor response to action 
taken based on such referrals by the United States). 
 77 See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 75. In the case of Denmark’s claim to the Lomonosov 
ridge, this could have serious repercussions, as the extent of Denmark’s jurisdiction with 
respect to this region is currently unknown.  
 78 JUAN FERNANDO CAICEDO RESTREPO, ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION CONCERNED WITH 
OFFSHORE PLATFORM DISCHARGES 5, available at http://www.oilandgasforum.net/manageme 
nt/paperlegisl.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
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sources.79 Compounding these difficulties, Russia has increased shipping 
traffic on the Northern Sea Route, and more ships will be taking this route 
in coming years.80 
Considering both the Lomonosov Ridge dispute between Denmark 
and Russia, and Norway’s new agreed upon treaty with Russia, these gaps 
in the existing environmental legal framework should be cause for concern. 
Of particular concern is that Russia, the world’s leading exporter of oil and 
natural gas, is acting aggressively to secure its interests with respect to hy-
drocarbon exploitation despite environmental risks.81 For example, in the 
Shtokman field located in the Barents Sea near the newly delineated Nor-
wegian-Russian boundary, Russia is hurriedly approving oil and gas drilling 
without adhering to proper environmental protocol.82 In addition, Russian 
scientists predict that by 2020 the exploration and development of this field 
will be “critical for sustainability and further development of Russia’s oil 
and gas complex and national economy,” increasing pressure on Russia to 
develop and establish sovereignty in the Arctic, in places such as the Lo-
monosov Ridge and the Barents Sea.83 Russia is also constructing floating 
nuclear power plants in order to exploit these resources, compounding the 
  
 79 See INT’L MAR. ORG., MARPOL-HOW TO DO IT: MANUAL ON THE PRACTICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF RATIFYING, IMPLEMENTING, AND ENFORCING MARPOL 73/78, 91–106 
(2003) (detailing some of the difficulties with technical aspects of enforcing MARPOL 
73/78, such as collecting highly evanescent evidence and the need to inspect every ship).   
 80 Paul Goble, Increasing Traffic on the Northern Sea Route Sparks Security Concerns in 
Moscow, GEORGIAN DAILY (Oct. 21, 2010), http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com 
_content&task=view&id=20247&Itemid=72. 
 81 See Owen Matthews, So Long, Salad Days, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www. 
newsweek.com/2010/02/23/so-long-salad-days.html (noting Russia’s past conduct with 
respect to gas cutoffs to Ukraine and Europe, status as a leading energy supplier, and its 
attempts to assert control over Arctic development of oil and natural gas via state-run oil 
companies); see also Julia Werdigier, BP Forms Partnership to Explore in Russia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011 at B1 (describing $7.8 billion deal between Russian-owned Rosneft and 
British Petroleum to exploit oil on Russia’s continental shelf as well as plans to establish an 
Arctic technology center).  
 82 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, WWF Calls for Investigation into Russian Hydrocarbon Ex-
traction Project (Sept. 19, 2010), http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/arctic/ 
news/?195030. The CEO of Statoil, a Norwegian partner in the Shtokman field has also 
reportedly indicated fears of corruption regarding the project and that, “a number of other 
serious challenges [exist], including lack of local infrastructure.” Statoil Sees "Serious" 
Shtokman Risks-Wikileaks, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOil 
News/idAFLDE70611620110107.  
 83 A.E. Kontorovich, et. al, Geology and Hydrocarbon Resources of the Continental Shelf 
in Russian Arctic Seas and the Prospects of Their Development 51 RUSSIAN GEOLOGY & 
GEOPHYSICS 10 (2010).  
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environmental risks associated with drilling for oil and natural gas in this 
region.84  
2.  Increased obligations to indigenous peoples 
The Scandinavian states have an increased obligation to respect and 
integrate the wishes of their indigenous peoples into Arctic policy in com-
parison to the other members of the Arctic Five. For example, Denmark and 
Norway are party to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 
169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and members of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).85 Article 15 of 
ILO Convention 169 requires states party to allow indigenous groups to 
participate in the use, management and conservation of resources and re-
quires states to consult indigenous peoples prior to undertaking or permit-
ting resource exploitation.86 Though UNDRIP is a United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution, Article 32(2) of UNDRIP affirms that: 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peo-
ples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to ob-
tain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project af-
fecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connec-
tion with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water, or 
other resources.
87
   
The United States and Russia are not members of either of these in-
struments, and Canada only recently adopted UNDRIP.88 As the treaty de-
  
 84 While these floating nuclear plants are currently only being placed within Russia’s 
sovereign exclusive economic zone, they have potential for use on an extended continental 
shelf. Richard Galpin, The Struggle for Arctic Riches, BBC (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk /news/world-11381773; see also Karl Grossman, Floating Chernobyls, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/karl-grossman/floating-chernobyls_b_ 
698550.html (noting the environmental risks). 
 85 International Labour Organization [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous and Trib-
al Peoples in Independent Countries, Convention C169 (Jun. 27, 1989), available at http:// 
www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169]; United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]; see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, Hu-
man Rights and Arctic Resources, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 251, 275–78 (2009) (noting that the ILO 
Convention was the first legally binding recognition of indigenous rights to self-governance). 
 86 ILO Convention 169, supra note 85, art. 15. 
 87 UNDRIP, supra note 85, art. 32(2). 
 88 ILO Convention 169, supra note 85; UNDRIP, supra note 85. Upon adopting UNDRIP, 
Canada specifically noted, “the Declaration is a non-legally binding document that does not 
reflect customary international law nor change Canadian laws.” Press Release, Aboriginal 
Affairs & N. Dev. Can., Canada's Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/ia/dcl/ 
stmt-eng.asp. 
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limiting the maritime boundary line between Norway and Russia demon-
strates, the rights of indigenous peoples are at risk of being disregarded by 
international diplomacy when negotiating the Arctic continental shelf 
boundary and trans-boundary resource management issues with states that 
do not have the same obligations. Two groups in particular, the Greenland 
Inuit and the Sami, reside within Scandinavian territories and will be at risk 
for such neglect.   
a.  Greenland Inuit 
Denmark’s claim to the Lomonosov Ridge stems entirely from its 
connection to Greenland. After a period of colonial rule, Greenland became 
a part of the Danish state in 1953.89 The Home Rule Act of 2009 now grants 
Greenland autonomy over all domestic affairs, including natural resources, 
but excluding defense and international affairs.90 Denmark continues to pay 
subsidies to Greenland, but these payments will eventually diminish as 
Greenland begins to earn revenue related to its mineral resource activities.91 
In addition, the new Home Rule Act provides Greenland the opportunity to 
gain independence from Denmark. However, this would require an agree-
ment between Denmark and Greenland, ratified by referendum in Greenland 
and by the Danish Folketing.92    
Denmark has a significant duty to ensure that the indigenous peo-
ples of Greenland are afforded the opportunity to participate in resource 
management decisions and decisions affecting their territory.93 Greenlanders 
have a demonstrated interest in developing offshore oil to sustain their local 
economy, but they may be reluctant to abandon the safety net of their status 
as a Danish protectorate, unless they believe their interests are not adequate-
ly being represented in the international arena.94 If Denmark has any inten-
  
 89 GARTH NETTHEIM, GARY D. MEYERS & DONNA CRAIG, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAND AND RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 191 (2002). 
 90 The Home Rule Act of 2009 replaced the 1979 version. Prior to the establishment of 
Home Rule in 1979, Greenland had limited involvement in its own governmental affairs. 
United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.19/2009/4/Add.4 (Mar. 3, 2009).  
 91 Id. Annex I, Chapter 3.  
 92 Id. Annex I, Chapter 8. 
 93 See Bratspies, supra note 85, at 277 (Construing obligations under ILO 169 and 
UNDRIP together).  
 94 See Andrew Ward & Sylvia Pfeifer, Greenland Sees Oil as Key to Independence, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ae57664-b134-11df-b899-
00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz15bHHb9As (noting the tension between the desire of 
Greenlanders to develop for oil and the notion that independence at the present moment 
could create reliance upon oil companies in place of Denmark). 
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tion of retaining sovereignty over Greenland, striving to protect the rights of 
its indigenous inhabitants will be critical.  
Denmark’s retention of Greenland and protection of indigenous 
rights is also essential in another dispute. Canada and Denmark both claim 
ownership of a tiny island, Hans Island, in the Kennedy Channel.95 Oil and 
gas reserves may be present in the surrounding seabed, though it is likely 
the island’s true significance lies in its relative proximity to the Northwest 
Passage and the ability to regulate the entry of ships into this passage.96 
While some scholars have downplayed the significance of this island, the 
two states have often made outward political demonstrations of ownership, 
and have, for the time being, agreed to disagree.97 Nonetheless, Denmark’s 
best argument for establishing sovereignty in this dispute is that the Green-
land Inuit use the island as part of their traditional hunting grounds.98 
Should these states enter negations as to the island’s ownership, Denmark is 
under an obligation to include and will have a strong interest in including 
the Greenland Inuit that Canada does not.99  
b.  Sami people of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia  
Norway is also a member of ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP.100 
The Sami people, whom these instruments have been ratified to protect, 
inhabit the northernmost reaches of not only Norway, but also Sweden, Fin-
land, and Russia.101 These people rely primarily on reindeer herding;102 a 
traditionally nomadic way of life vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
and globalization, and interdependent upon the stability of the natural envi-
ronment.103   
  
 95 MICHAEL BYERS, WHO OWNS THE ARCTIC? 22–24 (2009). Hans Island is the last remain-
ing territorial based dispute in the entire Arctic. Id.  
 96 See Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off!: The Struggle for Hans Island and the Potential 
Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
263, 268 (2007) (Noting the potential lucrative benefits of such regulation).  
 97 BYERS, supra note 95, at 28–30. 
 98 See id. at 24–25. (Citing statements made by Danish officials).  
 99 See Aboriginal Affairs & N. Dev. Can., supra note 88. Though it is party to UNDRIP, 
Canada has noted the nature of this treaty as a non-binding “aspirational document” and 
including the Greenland Inuit in this discussion would be directly adverse to its interests.  
100 Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ 
standards/relm/country.htm (last updated May 19, 2011); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th 
plen. mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
101 NETTHEIM, MEYERS & CRAIG, supra note 89, at 209.  
102 Id. (stating that reindeer herding is one principal aspect of the Sami livelihood). 
103 KESKITALO, supra note 22, at 138–43 (discussing the vulnerability of reindeer herding 
to a variety of factors associated with global climate change and globalization, including the 
ability to adapt). 
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In order to fulfill its obligations under these international docu-
ments, Norway must ensure the rights of the Sami to political participation 
in resource management decisions.104 To a certain extent Norway has 
sought to do so by implementing the Sami Act, which requires consultation 
by all levels of the Norwegian government with the Sami Parliament in de-
cisions affecting Sami affairs.105 However, the extent of Sami rights to do-
minion over natural resources is still unclear, and remains contested.106 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland have established mutual cooperation with 
respect to Sami issues since 2001, but Russia has not participated in such 
efforts.107 Russia has done very little to ensure national political participa-
tion of Sami and other indigenous peoples of the Arctic in resource man-
agement decisions.108  
States such as Russia and Canada are likely to take positions with 
respect to the inclusion of indigenous groups in resource management deci-
sions directly at odds with those of the Scandinavian states. The Norwegian-
Russian treaty demonstrates that bilateral negotiations regarding Arctic de-
limitation are insufficient to adequately incorporate the interests and rights 
of indigenous peoples, and this approach should be avoided with respect to 
division of the Lomonosov Ridge. Scandinavian states should seek to sup-
port and promote a stable forum for indigenous participation, with a view to 
upholding ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP. The Arctic Council provides 
  
104 Bratspies, supra note 85, at 275–78 (stating that Articles 32 of UNDRIP and ILO Con-
vention 169 both require member states to honor many indigenous rights, including those in 
resource management decision on or affecting their territories). 
105 NETTHEIM, MEYERS & CRAIG, supra note 89, at 217. (explaining that the Sami Act re-
quires all national, regional and local authorities to consult with the Sami parliament before 
making any decisions that may affect the Sami people). Finland and Sweden also have Sami 
parliaments. Id.    
106 Id. at 217–19 (summarizing the differences in recognized land ownership and natural 
resource rights between the Sami and Norwegian parliaments). 
107 Nordic Sami Cooperation, MINISTRY OF GOV’T ADMIN., REFORM AND CHURCH AFFAIRS, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fad/Selected-topics/Sami-policy/nordic-sami-
cooperation.html?id=24390 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
108 See ASS’N OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THE RUSS. N. AND INST. FOR ECOLOGY AND 
ACTION ANTHROPOLOGY, PARALLEL INFORMATION: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS 
SMALL-NUMBERED PEOPLES OF THE RUSSIAN NORTH, SIBERIA AND THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST 3–
4 (Johannes Rohr et al. eds., 2008) (noting the lack of inclusion of indigenous groups in 
decision making regarding use of natural resources and the vulnerability of such groups); see 
also United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, at 13–
18, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2009/4/Add.7 (Apr. 2, 2009) (generalizing minimal steps taken to 
protect the rights of indigenous peoples in Russia).  
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one such forum in which Scandinavian states can ensure this interest will be 
protected, as will be discussed in more detail in Part IV.109  
3.  Denuclearization  
Scandinavian interests in security are also at risk of being disre-
garded by the current legal framework governing the Arctic. Scandinavian 
states have long demonstrated an interest in ensuring a nuclear-free Arctic 
and have recently advanced support for such proposals.110 Under the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Canada, Denmark, 
and Norway are committed to remain non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), 
whereas the United States and Russia are designated as nuclear weapons 
states (NWS).111 This treaty obligates NNWS not to produce or receive nu-
clear weapons, while allowing NWS to possess them.112 Of particular rele-
vance to this discussion is Article VI, which encourages states to develop 
nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ).113    
In addition to being NNWS, another reason states such as Denmark 
and Norway have a particular interest in the creation of a NWFZ in the Arc-
tic is a conscious memory of the Danish experience during the height of the 
Cold War at Thule Air Base in 1968.114 This incident involved an American 
B-52 bomber carrying four nuclear bombs as part of an airborne alert mis-
sion.115 A cabin fire onboard caused the bomber to crash, releasing radioac-
tive uranium and plutonium, although the explosion itself was not nucle-
  
109 See Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ 
en/about-us/permanentparticipants (last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (describing the participatory 
role of indigenous peoples).  
110 See generally DANISH INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, CONFERENCE ON AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-
WEAPON-FREE ZONE (Cindy Vestergaard, ed., 2010) (calling for the establishment of a nu-
clear weapon free zone in the Arctic). See Torbjørn Graff Hugo, An Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zone: A Norwegian Perspective, in CONFERENCE ON AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-
FREE ZONE 39, 41 (Cindy Vestergaard, ed., 2010) (noting the Nordic Council suggested a 
nuclear weapon free zone in the Arctic as early as 1993). 
111 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT] (explaining the duties and obligations of 
both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states under the treaty).  
112 Id. art. I, II. While allowing NWS to possess nuclear weapons, the preamble to the NPT 
notes the intention of states party to, “achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarma-
ment.” Id. 
113 Id. art. VI. 
114 See generally Jens Zinglersen, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Arctic in DANISH 
INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, CONFERENCE ON AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE 113–17 
(Cindy Vestergaard, ed., 2010) (describing the Danish experience with respect to the Thule 
nuclear accident).  
115 Id. at 114.  
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ar.116 Many Danish and Thule workers involved in the massive clean-up 
operation suffered radiation poisoning.117    
There are several challenges to the creation of a NWFZ in the Arc-
tic.118 For example, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and the United States are 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which includes a nu-
clear role as part of its strategic alliance.119 Mustering political will from 
Russia and the United States to ban nuclear submarine transit will also be a 
significant obstacle.120 However, the Cold War is long over and NATO and 
Russia are beginning to cooperate very positively. The two recently signed a 
partnership agreement, specifically stating, “the NATO nations and Russia 
have, today, agreed, in writing, that while we face many security challenges, 
we pose no threat to each other.”121 If there truly is no longer any perceived 
security threat between the Arctic Five, then the need for nuclear weapons 
in the Arctic becomes moot. Furthermore, there is no reason why NNWS 
cannot begin discussion of a NWFZ at this stage.122  
IV. A SCANDINAVIAN MODEL 
A.  The Arctic Council  
The UNCLOS dispute resolution system currently leaves the con-
flicting claim issue up to international diplomacy, which has the potential 
for putting the interests of Scandinavian states directly at odds with other 
members of the Arctic Five. To protect their interests in the environment, 
the rights of their indigenous peoples, and their security concerns, the Scan-
dinavian states should develop a comprehensive strategic approach. The 
most appropriate forum in which these states will be able to pursue such an 
approach is within the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council evolved as a high 
level intergovernmental forum from the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protec-
  
116 Id. at 114–15.  
117 Id. at 115–16. 
118 See MICHAEL WALLACE & STEVEN STAPLES, RIDDING THE ARCTIC OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS: A TASK LONG OVERDUE 10–14 (2010) (Identifying nuclear submarine transit by 
NWS, the location of Russian naval bases, and the political position of the United States as 
major obstacles to negotiating a NWFZ).  
119 See North Atlantic Treaty art. 5–8, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 
(providing for the collective defense of member states, this provision could allow NWS to 
station nuclear weapons in a NNWS in the event of an armed attack).  
120 WALLACE & STAPLES, supra note 118. 
121 NATO-Russia Set on Path Towards Strategic Partnership, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Nov. 
20, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-F267F097-DC26FE3A/natolive/news_68876.htm.  
122 The negotiation of a NWFZ can effectively begin piecemeal. WALLACE & STAPLES, 
supra note 118, at 14–17. 
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tion Strategy and is “the only major intergovernmental initiative for the Arc-
tic involving all eight Arctic states.”123    
The Arctic Council already includes participation for indigenous 
peoples and has six working groups devoted to environmental issues.124 
However, the Arctic Council lacks the ability to impose any binding envi-
ronmental regulation based on its scientific studies, a permanent source of 
funding, and legal status as an international organization.125 Scandinavian 
states have often been footing the bill for the projects undertaken by the 
Arctic Council.126 Considering the complex web of international treaties 
pertaining to the Arctic, the Arctic Council is in need of a legal mandate to 
avoid becoming a defunct body, and to prevent unorganized and uncoordi-
nated approaches to oil and natural gas development as continental shelf 
boundaries are negotiated and extended and the Arctic continues to melt.127 
B.  Leading the Charge: Proposal 
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden have announced common interests 
in chairing the Arctic Council, and consecutively hold the chairmanship 
until 2012.128 The Nordic Council, of which all three of these states are 
members, has already recommended moving toward an expanded role for 
the Arctic Council as the primary model of Arctic governance.129 In addi-
  
123 Members of the Arctic Council are: the United States, Canada, Russia, Denmark, Swe-
den, Norway, Finland, and Iceland. Evan T. Bloom, Establishment of the Arctic Council, 93 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 712 (1999).  
124 These working groups include: the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arc-
tic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fau-
na (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working Group 
(SDWG). Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php 
/en/about-us/working-groups (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).  
125 See Bloom, supra note 123, at 718–22 (describing these impotencies).  
126 Id. at 718–19 (“Norway pays the secretariat for AMAP, Iceland for PAME, Iceland and 
the United States for CAFF, and Denmark provides most of the funding for the Indigenous 
Peoples’ Secretariat.”). 
127 Timo Koivurova, Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty: Evaluation and a New Proposal 17 
REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 14, 26 (2008).  
128 Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish Common Objectives for their Arctic Council Chair-
manships 2006–2013, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index. 
php/en/about-us/chairmanship/89-resources/about.  
129 See NORDIC COUNCIL, COMMITTEE PROPOSAL ON JURISPRUDENTIAL RESEARCH IN THE 
MARINE AREAS IN THE NORTH AND AN ARCTIC TREATY § 6 (2006) (“The Nordic Council 
recommends to the Nordic Council of Ministers that efforts be made, in co-operation with 
the Arctic Council, to establish an Arctic treaty.”), available at http://www.norden.org/en/ 
nordic-council/cases/a-1392-medborger. The Nordic Council is an inter-parliamentary union 
and also includes Finland, Iceland and the territories of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and the 
Åland Islands. In 2006 it proposed, “The Nordic Council recommends to the Nordic Council 
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tion, these states have already taken the initiative to make the financial re-
sources available for a permanent secretariat until the end of 2012.130   
The inclusion of Scandinavian interests in environmental protec-
tion, indigenous rights, and security in a proposal regarding the Arctic is 
key for several reasons. The Scandinavian states have much to contribute to 
informing sound policy for managing Arctic resources. For example, im-
plementing the Scandinavian approach to sustainable development under 
agreements such as OSPAR and the 1993 Agreement can serve as a balanc-
ing mechanism to offset aggressive hydrocarbon exploration and exploita-
tion. Ensuring the enforcement of precautionary measures and promoting a 
sustainable development approach in the Arctic is of interest to states out-
side the Arctic Five as well.131   
The international community also has an interest in the inclusion of 
the rights of indigenous groups in resource management decisions. Support-
ing the incorporation of traditional knowledge of indigenous groups into 
resource management policies may help slow the effects of global climate 
change.132 In addition, preserving the livelihoods of indigenous groups such 
as the Greenland Inuit and Sami are essential to enriching the world’s cul-
tural diversity.133  
Scandinavian states can also lead the discussion of Arctic denucle-
arization. Danish and Norwegian membership in NATO as well as the Dan-
ish experience at Thule air base can assist in providing the political will 
necessary for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Arctic. The creation of a 
NWFZ in the Arctic will assist NWS in rising to the challenge set forth by 
  
of Ministers that efforts be made, in co-operation with the Arctic Council, to establish an 
Arctic treaty.” Nordic Council, NORDEN, http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
130 See ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 128. 
131 See Neva Collins, Environment, in U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, at 95–97, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328, U.N. Sales No. 09.VI.13 
(2009) (summarizing the impacts of global climate change upon the environment and the 
world’s indigenous peoples). 
132 See id. at 94, 102, 115 (noting the important role traditional knowledge of biodiversity 
can play and recognition of indigenous groups in sustainable development by the Johannes-
burg Plan of Implementation); see also KESKITALO, supra note 22, at 104–07 (discussing 
mechanization of reindeer herding).  
133 Despite being a numerical minority, indigenous groups speak a majority of the world’s 
languages and are in danger of extinction. See Naomi Kipuri, Culture, in U.N. DEP’T OF 
ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, STATE OF THE WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, at 57–67, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/328, U.N. Sales No. 09.VI.13 (2009) (acknowledging the value of indigenous lan-
guage, spiritual belief systems, social institutions, and traditional knowledge in enriching the 
world’s culture).  
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the NPT to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and provide a more secure, 
transparent, and accountable environment for the entire globe.134     
A lack of political will from other members of the Arctic Council 
may inhibit the creation of any type of binding treaty framework to govern 
the Arctic, but strengthening the capacity of the Arctic Council to address 
the issues it already deals with is not beyond the scope of viability.135 More-
over, enhancing the capacity of the Arctic Council provides the distinct ad-
vantages of: formalizing and integrating an already existing web of treaties; 
a short time frame; low cost; and manageable structural changes, which can 
assist in developing the consensus needed for this initiative. In addition, 
indigenous groups could retain their status as permanent participants within 
the working groups of the Council, ensuring that their consultation contin-
ues to play an important role in decision making about resource manage-
ment.   
The Scandinavian states should lead the Arctic Council to establish 
a working group designed specifically to audit and consider proposals for a 
comprehensive Arctic treaty, that have already been made by observers 
within the Arctic Council.136 The Scandinavian states should lead this push 
to protect their interests in the Arctic, as they are directly involved in re-
gions where the potential for conflicting resource management strategies to 
develop is high, such as the Lomonosov Ridge and the Barents Sea.137 Any 
treaty proposal should not seek to supplant the work of other international 
treaties such as UNCLOS, OSPAR, the 1993 Agreement between Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, or MARPOL 73/78, but rather, to 
harmonize these approaches to regulating oil and natural gas exploration 
and development on the extended continental shelves.  
Drawing upon OSPAR, an Arctic treaty should at minimum require 
states to implement the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, 
and to utilize best available techniques, best environmental practices, and 
  
134 NPT, supra note 111 (The preamble to the NPT was written in the spirit of “desiring to 
further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in 
order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all 
their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and 
the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.”). 
135 See Oran Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North 
45 POLAR RECORD 73, 79–81 (2009) (suggesting that a lack of political will inhibit the Arctic 
Council from transitioning into a formal regulatory organization). 
136 See Koivurova, supra note 127, at 23 (discussing such proposals made by WWF Arctic, 
Linda Nowlan, and Rosemary Rayfuse).  
137 See generally supra Part III.A (describing the potential for conflict in the Lomonosov 
region and the Barents Sea). See KOIVUROVA & MOLENAAR, supra note 65 and accompany-
ing text (noting the conflicting obligations of states party to UNCLOS and OSPAR with 
respect to hydrocarbon exploitation). 
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the latest developments in technology to minimize negative impacts on the 
environment.138 A mechanism for resolving disputes arising under the treaty 
regarding the application of these principles must be clearly designated and 
agreed to by all parties. In order to avoid technical problems, such as those 
encountered with the enforcement of MARPOL 73/78,139 an Arctic a treaty 
should also include a monitoring, investigatory, and reporting regime mod-
eled after that of the 1993 Agreement, providing for mutual assistance and 
protocols for emergency disaster response.140 Such provisions serve to en-
sure the sustainable development of Arctic resources in a manner consistent 
with the current Scandinavian approach.  
An Arctic Treaty that formalizes the current Arctic Council into a 
formal international organization with a legal mandate is a proposal that 
may be well suited to Scandinavian interests, as the Arctic Council already 
includes participation for indigenous groups. Whether or not such a pro-
posal is adopted, the Arctic treaty working group should invite the participa-
tion of indigenous groups as permanent participants. Consistent with ILO 
Convention 169 and UNDRIP, an Arctic treaty should involve indigenous 
groups in drafting and provide for their consultation on decisions regarding 
international resource management.141 Finally, alongside the Arctic treaty 
working group, a specific working group should be designated to facilitate 
openness and dialogue as to the development of a NWFZ, in accordance 
with obligations under the NPT and the North Atlantic Treaty.    
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note stops just short of suggesting the appropriate treaty re-
gime for Arctic governance. However, the Arctic Council is more than suf-
ficiently equipped at this time to establish a working group to begin discus-
sion of such a treaty. What remains to be seen is which states will take the 
initiative to do so.  
The UNCLOS continental shelf delimitation framework leaves the 
resolution of disputes up to international diplomacy. The interests of Scan-
dinavian states in environmental resource management, indigenous inclu-
sion, and security are at risk for neglect and exploitation in both the Lo-
monosov Ridge dispute and the Norwegian-Russian maritime delimitation 
  
138 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (defining these principles).  
139 See supra Part III.B.1 (noting the technical difficulties associated with enforcement of 
MARPOL 73/78). 
140 1993 Agreement, supra note 67, art. 2–8. 
141 ILO Convention 169, supra note 85, art. 15 (requiring the rights of these indigenous and 
tribal peoples to be specially safeguarded and requiring that “governments shall establish or 
maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples . . . .”); UNDRIP, supra 
note 85, art. 32.2 (requiring states to “consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned . . . .”). 
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treaty. As pressure to develop the Arctic’s resources mount, conflicting de-
velopment strategies between the Arctic Five threaten a sustainable and 
precautionary approach to natural resource exploitation. Scandinavian in-
digenous groups, while included in the Arctic Council and Scandinavian 
governments, face exclusion from natural resource management decisions in 
the Arctic that directly influence their livelihood and survival. Finally, the 
security interests of the Arctic Five are not at odds, and the creation of a 
NWFZ is long overdue.  
Considering the gaps in the current legal framework governing the 
Arctic, Scandinavian states have a strong incentive to lead the way toward 
the creation of a comprehensive multilateral Arctic treaty. Such a treaty 
could provide Scandinavian states with a mechanism for ensuring a sustain-
able approach to Arctic resource management, honoring the rights of their 
respective indigenous groups, and achieving denuclearization of the Arctic. 
Because UNCLOS ultimately leaves the resolution of conflicting continen-
tal shelf claims up to international diplomacy, Scandinavian states must 
develop a strategic approach to ensure these national interests are protected 
and that this important region does not devolve into a lawless frontier. The 
best route to resolving Arctic sovereignty, from a Scandinavian perspective, 
is the creation of a working group within the Arctic Council to consider 
proposals for an Arctic treaty. 
